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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
David Joseph Meister asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the
Idaho Court of Appeals, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 402 (Ct. App. March 14, 2014)

(hereinafter, Opinion).

He submits that the Opinion, which affirmed his Judgment of

Conviction, is in conflict with previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court
and this Court because the Court of Appeals misapplied the harmless error test.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On December 11, 2001, Tonya Hart was shot twice in her home in Moscow,
Idaho, which she shared with her boyfriend, Jesse Linderman. State v. Meister, 148
Idaho 236, 238 (2009).

In August of 2002, the police interrogated Mr. Meister in

connection with Ms. Hart's death and Mr. Meister stated that he shot Ms. Hart in
exchange for a $1000 payment from Jesse Linderman. Id. Mr. Meister was charged
with first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Id. Charges were initially
filed against Mr. Linderman for conspiracy to commit murder but those charges were
later dismissed because the only evidence tying Mr. Linderman to the crime was Mr.
Meister's confession. Id. At trial, Mr. Meister attempted to admit evidence that another
individual, Lane Thomas, was responsible for Ms. Hart's shooting. Id. The district court
refused any evidence which showed Mr. Thomas was an alternate perpetrator of the
crime, including several confessions. Id. Mr. Meister was convicted on both counts and
the district court sentenced him to a fixed term of life for the murder conviction, and a
unified sentence of life with 40 years fixed for the conspiracy conviction. Id.
Mr. Meister appealed and the Idaho Supreme Court reversed his convictions and
remanded for a new trial. Id. at 243. The Court held that the district court had applied
the wrong legal standard when determining whether to admit evidence that Mr. Thomas
was an alternative perpetrator. Id. The case was remanded to the district court.
On remand, the district court held that it was bound by the Idaho Supreme
Court's opinion in this case, but that it was not bound by the law of the case regarding
issues that were decided by the Court of Appeals but were unaddressed by the
Supreme Court. (R., p.351.) The court further held that rulings from the first trial that
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were not appealed, would only be considered upon a showing that the district court's
original ruling was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. (R., p.353.)
The court later clarified that, with regard to whether there was a Miranda violation or
whether Mr. Meister's confession was coerced, Mr. Meister would be required to
present new evidence establishing that the prior rulings regarding these issues were
clearly erroneous and resulted in a manifest injustice. (R., pp.1057-58.)
Mr. Meister then filed a motion to suppress his interrogation, asserting that he
was not properly advised of his Miranda rights, that the interrogation was not recorded,
and that his confession was coerced. (R., p.368.)
The State then filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude any evidence
suggesting that Lane Thomas or anyone else was the killer and any evidence relating to
the status of the criminal charges against Jesse Linderman in regard to Ms. Hart's
murder. (R., p.429.) Mr. Meister objected to this motion with regard to the alternate
perpetrator issue. (R., p.468.)
Regarding the suppression of Mr. Meister's interrogation, the court ruled that the
totality of the circumstances, including the new information presented by Mr. Meister,
did not support a finding that Mr. Meister's confession was coerced.

(R., p.1077.)

Further, the court ruled that Mr. Meister had failed to demonstrate that the prior ruling
regarding these issues was either clearly erroneous or would work a manifest injustice.
(R., p.1077.) Regarding the Miranda issue, the court noted that no new evidence was

presented on this issue and, therefore, Mr. Meister had failed to demonstrate that the
prior ruling was either clearly erroneous or would work a manifest injustice.
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(R., p.1077.) Regarding the failure to record the interrogation, the court ruled that Idaho
law did not require interrogations to be recorded. (R., p.1079.)
The district court then ruled on the alternate perpetrator issue, holding that the
jury would be permitted to hear evidence that Lane Thomas was an alternate
perpetrator. (R., p.1346.) The court also granted the State's motion in limine regarding
the status of Mr. Linderman's criminal charges. (R., p.1357.)
The State then filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude the testimony of
Dr. Richard Ofshe, Mr. Meister's expert on coerced confessions.

(R., p.1472.)

The

State reasoned that, because the district court had determined that Mr. Meister's
confession was not coerced, the testimony was not relevant. (R., p.1474.) The court
ruled that Dr. Ofshe could not testify that Mr. Meister's confession was false, but could
testify on circumstances surrounding false confessions generally.

(R., pp.1589-91.)

The case then proceeded to trial. (R., p.1705.)
At trial, the evidence demonstrated that at approximately 10:15 p.m., on the night
of December 11, 2001, two gunshots were heard at a trailer park on Highway 95, just
outside Moscow, Idaho. (Tr., p.909, Ls.1-11.) One of the residents of that trailer park,
Keith Wilde, got up to investigate the "two loud bangs" that he had heard. (Tr., p.909,
Ls.12-15.) His investigation eventually led him to the back door of his neighbor's trailer,
the one occupied by Tonya Hart and her boyfriend, "Shorty" Linderman.

(Tr., p.910,

Ls.8-12.) He found the back door ajar and he eventually pushed inside; he found Tonya
Hart's body on the floor of her trailer, and, after unsuccessfully trying to revive Ms. Hart,
he returned hometocall 911. (Tr., p.917, L.13-p.923, L.24.)
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Local police officers received a dispatch call at about 10:23 pm.

(Tr., p.973,

Ls.13-17.) Officers quickly determined that Ms. Hart was likely dead already and then
proceeded to clear the trailer.

(Tr., p.980, Ls.1-5.) Investigating officers determined

that Ms. Hart had been shot twice-once near her right eye, and once in her chest.
(Tr., p.986, Ls.1-6, p.1007, Ls.11-15.) They also found footprints in the snow leading
from the back of the trailer, across a field, across some fences, and eventually out onto
North Polk Extension.

(Tr., p.988, Ls.5-7, p.990, Ls.18-19, p.1035, L.18 - p.1037,

L.21.) Officers also found a nearly empty briefcase in the snow near the intersection of
North Polk Extension and Foothill Road. (Tr., p.1439, Ls.15-18.)
The police learned that the bullets and casings were nine millimeter rounds which
had been "remanufactured" by a company called Ultramax, and had been fired out of a
nine millimeter pistol. (Tr., p.1473, Ls.3-17, p.1491, Ls.16-17.) They also learned that
individual leaving the footprints at the scene had been wearing Osiris ODS sneakers
that were likely between sizes eight and one-half to nine and one-half. (Tr., p.1408,
Ls.14-15, p.1713, Ls.19-22.)
The briefcase found near North Polk Extension had belonged to Jeremy White,
Mr. Meister's roommate, and had been stolen by Lane Thomas the day before
Ms. Hart's murder. (Tr., p.1487, L.19 - p.1489, L.21.) Mr. Thomas stole the briefcase
because he knew it contained marijuana. (Tr., p.1489, Ls.15-19.) Police also learned
that a man, probably with longish curly brown hair, had been seen walking on Highway
95, near the scene of the murder, wearing a yellow plaid shirt, at approximately 10:00
p.m., or shortly thereafter. (Tr., p.1162, L3 - p.1167, L.19.)
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Mr. Meister was known to wear Osiris shoes.

(Tr., p.1744, Ls.10-13.) Duane

Scott, who used to be Mr. Meister's roommate, testified that Mr. Meister had given him
some Osiris shoes; he also stated that he had asked Mr. Meister once if he believed the
theft of the briefcase was related to the murder, and Mr. Meister allegedly stated, "what
would you say if I told you I did it." (Tr., p.1757, Ls.1-4.) Remarkably, Mr. Scott did not
relay this information to the police until 2003. (Tr., p.1760, Ls.23-25.)
Also, rather remarkably, after he was contacted by the police about testifying at
the retrial, Mr. Scott remembered that on the night of the Ms. Hart's death, he saw
Mr. Meister wearing dark clothes and Mr. Meister stated he was going out to take care
of business. (Tr., p.1763, Ls.5-13.) Mr. Scott testified that he did not "remember" this
event at the time of the first trial but somehow had remembered it at the time of the
second trial. (Tr., p.1766, Ls.5-20.)
At the end of March 2002, Detective Hall, the lead investigator in the Hart murder
case, was contacted by Michael Garrison.

(Tr., p.1490, Ls.14-25.)

Based on this

contact with Mr. Garrison, police learned that Mr. Garrison had sold Mr. Meister a nine
millimeter Hi Point handgun and a box of Ultramax remanufactured ammunition a few
weeks before Ms. Hart's murder.

{Tr., p.2274, Ls.14-15.) Police then focused their

investigation on Mr. Meister.
In April, 2002, Detective Hall met with Mr. Meister at the Boundary County
Courthouse in Bonner's Ferry. (Tr., p.1500, Ls.9-19.) Mr. Meister mentioned that his
roommate's briefcase had been stolen by Mr. Thomas shortly before the murder.
(Tr., p.1503, Ls.7-14.) Mr. Meister was not arrested after this meeting and the detective
returned to Moscow. (Tr., p.1508, Ls.23-24.)
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The detectives then asked Mr. Garrison to make some "one-party consent" calls
to Mr. Meister about the gun. (Tr., p.1509 Ls.10-1
(Tr., p.1510, Ls.6-7.)

) He made three of these calls.

When these calls proved to be unfruitful, the detectives decided

to interrogate Mr. Meister further.
Detective Hall made contact with Mr. Meister at his home around 2:00 p.m. on
August 29, 2002, and asked Mr. Meister to come to the police station; Mr. Meister
agreed. (Tr., p.1524, Ls.5-24.) That day, Mr. Meister had gotten up at 6:00 a.m., took
some energy pills he purchased at a gas station, and went to work at the Mark IV
restaurant.

(Tr., p.3145, L.3 - p.3148, L.10.)

showering when Detective Hall arrived.

He came home with the intention of

(Tr., p.3152, Ls.13-18.)

Detective Hall and

Mr. Meister met Detective Westbrook at the police station at approximately 2:30 p.m.
(Tr., p.1524, Ls.5-20.)
Unfortunately, we can never be sure what, exactly, happened for the next four
hours or so as police officers made the conscious decision that they would not tape any
portion of that interrogation unless or until Mr. Meister confessed. There is a factual
dispute as to whether Mr. Meister was ever given a full Miranda warning, whether the
police used coercive interrogation techniques such as threatening him with the death
penalty, then offering leniency if he confessed, and whether, through their questions,
the interrogators may have offered up details that ultimately allowed Mr. Meister to give
a detailed confession. (See generally, Tr., pp.2007-2238, 3061-3404.)
Detective Westbrook acknowledged

that

he

provided

Mr.

Meister with

photographs of the footprints, ammunition, and bullet casings and told him he knew the
type of gun that was used. (Tr., p.2027, L.14 - p.2035, L.6.) Mr. Meister initially denied
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any involvement with the crime but Detective Westbrook told Mr. Meister that he did not
believe him and that the evidence clearly showed that he was involved. (Tr., p.2036,
Ls.16-24.) At one point in the interview, Mr. Meister asked Detective Westbrook why he
had not been arrested yet, and Westbrook replied, "I've been involved in another case
here in Latah County, another murder case. And I told him in that case, I didn't - I didn't
even interview the suspect in that case; that, quite frankly, I thought he was a piece of
shit, and he was a cold blooded murderer." (Tr., p.2062, Ls.5-10.) In contrast, he told
Mr. Meister that he believed that he had been "put up to it by somebody else and a cold
blooded killer that set the whole stage in motion," and believed that he was just, "a ·19year-o!d kid that had got himself in over his head; and had somebody not put him up to
this, that we wouldn't be here today." (Tr., p.2063, Ls.1-3, p.2063, L.24 - p.2064, L.3.)
At this point, Meister confessed to conspiring with Mr. Linderman to murder Ms. Hart
and, in fact, shooting her. (Tr., p.2065, L.5 - p.2068, L.24.) After this confession, the
Detective then decided to videotape a confession. (Tr., p.2075, Ls.1-21.)
Mr. Meister's defense was that his confession was false and that Lane Thomas
was likely the actual perpetrator of the crime.

The defense first called Dr. Richard

Ofshe, an expert in the field of false confessions. (Tr., p.2934, Ls.13-17.) His testimony
is described in detail in Section 11, supra.

He was generally critical of the technique

employed by Detective Westbrook due to its tendency to create compliant false
confessions, although he was prohibited from discussing Detective Westbrook's
questioning specifially. (Tr., p.2934, L.13- p. 3060, L.10.)
Mr. Meister denied killing Ms. Hart and conspiring with Mr. Linderman to kill
Ms. Hart. (Tr., p.3061, Ls.1-10.) Mr. Meister acknowledged that he bought a gun from
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Mr. Garrison, testifying that he did so with the idea that one day he could make money
from selling guns. (Tr., p.3086, Ls.19-24, p.3094, Ls.5-22.) He believed that the gun
was delivered to him on December 7, 2001.

(Tr., p.3099, Ls.12-16.)

He initially

experimented with keeping the gun behind the grate of the refrigerator but ultimately put
the gun under this mattress. (Tr., p.3107, L.1-6.) Mr. Meister stated that he attended a
party in December and sold the gun to another party-goer that evening so he could
make some money. (Tr., p.3121, Ls.5-6.)
Mr. Meister testified that on the day that Ms. Hart was killed, he awoke in the
afternoon and headed to Pizza Pipeline, where he was employed, even though it was
his day off. (Tr., p.3130, Ls.1-17.) He remembered staying there for an hour or so and
helping some of the other employees; Mr. Meister acknowledged that no Pizza Pipeline
records indicated that he was there that day, but he was just there to hang out and eat
pizza. (Tr., p.3131, Ls.1-18.) He thought he went home around 8 p.m. (Tr., p.3133,
Ls.10-14.) He then contacted a neighbor, who was over 21, and they went to buy beer.
(Tr., p.3134, Ls.2-22.)

He drank beer with his neighbor until about 10:30 p.m.

(Tr., p.3136, Ls.8-10.) He returned to his place later and his roommate, Jeremy White,
was already home. (Tr., p.3137, Ls.16-21.)
At around 11 p.m. that evening, Mr. White learned that Pizza Pipeline was
closed; Mr. Meister and his friends then decided to go to Papa John's and get pizza.
(Tr., p.3140, Ls.4-25.) They then returned to Mr. Meister's residence and eventually a
group of people came over and said that Ms. Hart had been shot. (Tr., p.3142, Ls.1822.) Jennifer Young was among the people in this group who informed Mr. Meister that
Ms. Hart had been shot. (Tr., p.3727, L.3 - p.3728, L.20.)
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Mr. Meister testified that he confessed because he was implicitly threatened with
the death penalty and then implicitly promised leniency if he confessed. (Tr., p.3219,
Ls.12-15.) Mr. Meister stated he, "kind of resigned myself to my fate, essentially, at that
point; that I'm going to have to give these people what they want." (Tr., p.3224, L.24 p.3225, L.2.) He then made up a confession incorporating some of the footprint and
ballistics evidence the detectives shared with him. (Tr., p.3225, L.3 - p.3234, L.21.)
Both Michael Scanlon and Brian Kiem, who had been incarcerated with Lane
Thomas, testified that Lane Thomas had confessed to Ms. Hart's murder.

Mr. Kiem

testified that Mr. Thomas told him,
he was running drugs, and he would pick up drugs from a supplier, deliver
them to somebody. And then sometimes - not every time, but sometimes
he would come back and rob these people. And he said that it was a
perfect robbery because who's going to go to the cops about being robbed
for drugs, you know.
But he said he went to rob this trailer. And usually he had a partner with
him, you know, that nobody knew but him. But his partner couldn't come,
so he decided to do it anyway on his own, because he didn't think
anybody was there.
But he went to this trailer to rob it, and there was somebody there. There
was this - this girl was there, and she surprised him. And he said she
recognized him, and he shot her. And he got whatever he was looking for
and he left.
(Tr., p.3597, L.16 - p.3598, L.6.) Mr. Thomas was not worried about getting convicted
of this crime, according to Mr. Kiem, because Mr. Meister had already been convicted of
it. (Tr., p.3598, Ls.10-20.) Mr. Scanlon testified that Mr. Thomas told him that he and
another person went to Ms. Hart's trailer, where she was shot twice. {Tr., p.3628, Ls.15.) Mr. Thomas stated that the person that was with him pulled the trigger. (Tr., p.3628,
Ls.1-5.)
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Despite this evidence, Mr. Meister was convicted of both murder in the first
degree and conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree. (R., p.1934.) Mr. Meister
filed a motion for acquittal, or, in the alternative, a new trial, which was denied.
(R., p.1935.)

The district court imposed fixed life sentences for both counts.

(R., p.2007.) Mr. Meister appealed. (R., p.2011.)

The case was assigned to the Idaho Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
discussed the issue raised, but ultimately did not decide the issue on its merits. (See
Opinion.) The Court of Appeals concluded that any error was harmless because: 1)
Dr. Ofshe testified at trial and defense counsel, during closing statements, discussed
how his theories applied to the case; and 2) the evidence against Mr. Meister was
overwhelming. (Opinion, pp.8-10.) Mr. Meister then petitioned this Court for review.
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ISSUE
Should review be granted because the Court of Appeals' harmless error analysis is
contrary to opinions from both this Court and the United States Supreme Court?
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ARGUMENT
Review Should Be Granted Because The Court of Appeals misapplied the Harmless
Error Test

A.

Introduction
Mr. Meister asserts that review should be granted because the Court of Appeals

misapplied the harmless error test.

B.

Review Should Be Granted Because The Court of Appeals' Harmless Error
Analysis Is Contrary To Opinions From Both This Court And The United States
Supreme Court
In this case, the Court of Appeals held that any error was harmless. (Opinion,

pp.8-10.) In undertaking its analysis, the Court of Appeals essentially looked to whether
the strength of the remaining evidence presented by the State supported a guilty
verdict. Mr. Meister respectfully submits that this analysis is in conflict with precedent
from the United States Supreme Court and from this Court that defines the nature of
harmless error review for appellate courts.

See I.AR. 118(b )(2).

Accordingly,

Mr. Meister ask that this Court grant his Petition for Review.
First, the Court of Appeals concluded that the error was harmless because
counsel applied Dr. Ofshe's theory to the facts during closing argument. (Opinion, pp.89.) This argument ignores the role of expert witness testimony. Testimony of qualified
expert witnesses may be admitted if "scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue .... " I.R.E. 702. Thus, when the entire purpose of expert witness testimony is to
assist the jury it can hardly be said that error is harmless because counsel, who is not
an expert, attempted to apply the theory. Dr. Ofshe's testimony concerned information
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outside the range of knowledge of the average juror; it is pure speculation that counsel
adequately applied the science to the facts.
Next, the Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence against Mr. Meister was
overwhelming. (Opinion, pp.8-10). The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the notion
that the test for harmless error can be met by an appellate court essentially reweighing
the evidence - in absence of the error - for whether it would support a verdict of guilt. In
Neder v. United States, the Court clarified that:

A reviewing court making this harmless error inquiry does not, as Justice
Traynor put it, "become in effect a second jury to determine whether the
defendant is guilty." Rather a court, in typical appellate court fashion, asks
whether the record contains evidence that could rationally
to a
contrary finding regarding an omitted element.
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 19 (1999) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis

added).
That the reviewing court is not to hypothesize regarding whether the verdict
would have been the same without the error - for purposes of applying the harmless
error test on appeal - has been reinforced in other United States Supreme Court
opinions as well. This repudiation is most strongly articulated in Sullivan v. Louisiana in
the context of explaining the meaning of the Chapman harmless error test 1:
Consistent with the jury-trial guarantee, the question it instructs the
reviewing court to consider is not what effect the constitutional error might
be generally expected to have on a reasonable juror, but rather what
effect it had upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand. Harmless-error
review looks, we have said, to the basis on which "the jury actually rested
its verdict." The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that
occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been
rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial

The Sullivan Court ultimately did not apply the Chapman harmless error test, finding
that the error at issue in that case was structural and therefore required automatic
reversal. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 278-282.
1
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was surely unattributable to the error. That must be so, because to
hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered - no
matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be
- would violate the jury trial guarantee.

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279-280 (1993) (internal citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
This focus on the nature of the error that occurred, and the potential impact of
this error in light of the trial proceedings, emerges from the Chapman harmless error
test itself.

See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22-24 (1967).

Under this test,

harmless error is determined by looking to "whether there is a reasonable possibility that
the error complained of contributed to the conviction." Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23. This
requires the reviewing court to examine whether the error had an effect on the
defendant's substantial rights. Id. If the error could have possibly influenced the jury
adversely to the defendant, then it is not harmless.

Id. at 23-24.

Under this legal

standard, therefore, the reviewing court is tasked to examine, not merely the strength of
the State's remaining evidence, but primarily the nature of the error itself in relation to
the issues at trial, with an eye toward whether there was a possibility that this error
could have had sway with the jury.
This Court has adopted the harmless error test from Chapman with regard to
objected-to error, which is very difficult for the State to meet:.

"Where a defendant

alleges error at trial that he contemporaneously objected to, this Court reviews the error
on appeal under the harmless error test. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, (2010). "A
defendant appealing from an objected-to, non-constitutionally-based error shall have the
duty to establish that such an error occurred, at which point the State shall have the
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burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable

" Id.

(emphasis added).
Additionally, this Court has very recently clarified that the harmless error test is
not one in which the strength of the State's evidence is weighed in a vacuum, or in
which the appellate court believes that the defendant would have been found guilty in
absence of the error. In State v. Joy, this Court held that the Chapman harmless error
test requires the reviewing court to determine whether, "the error [is] unimportant in
relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in
the record." State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 10 (2013) (quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391,
403 (1991 )). This Court continued, 'Thus, an appellate court's inquiry 'is not whether, in
a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered,
but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to
the error."' Id. (quoting Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279).
Regarding the "overwhelming" evidence against Mr. Meister, the Court first
focused on the evidence of Mr. Meister's ownership of a gun that was consistent with
the type of gun used in the murder. (Opinion, pp.8-9.) However, Mr. Meister has never
denied buying a gun; rather, he has consistently stated throughout the history of this
case that he subsequently sold this gun at a party before Ms. Hart's murder.
(Tr., p.3086, Ls.19-24, p.3094, Ls.5-22; p.3121, Ls.5-6.)

He also explained that he

bought this gun with the idea that he would make money from selling guns in the future.
(Tr., p.3086, Ls.19-24, p.3094, Ls.5-22.)
The Court then discussed the type of shoe which left prints through the snow and
the description of the person seen walking down the highway. (Opinion, p.9.) While
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there was evidence that Mr. Meister owned this type of shoe, the authorities were never
able to actually find these shoes in Mr. Meister's possession, and these shoes were
commonly used in the skating community. Further, no witness who actually saw the
individual walking down the road was able to identify this person as Mr. Meister.
Finally, the Court considered the testimony of several witnesses who stated that
Mr. Meister confessed. One witness, as acknowledged by the Court of Appeals, stated
that Mr. Meister told him that he was only kidding. (Opinion, p.9.) The Court then relied
on the testimony of James Collyer, who claims that Mr. Meister confessed.
(Respondent's Brief, p.20.) However, the State acknowledged that Mr. Meister
addressed Mr. Collyer's testimony at trial and denied that he had made these
statements.

(Respondent's Brief, p.21.)

That the Court of Appeals and the State

believe that Mr. Collyer should be believed over Mr. Meister hardly meets the standard
for harmless error.
The error in this case was not harmless. Mr. Meister's defense was that he did
not commit the murder and that his confession was false. Dr. Ofshe's testimony went to
the heart of this defense, and it cannot be said that exclusion of his testimony was
harmless.

C.

If Review Is Granted, This Court Should Rule That The District Court Erred By
Excluding The Evidence And That The Error Was Not Harmless
The admission of expert testimony is governed by Idaho Rule of Evidence 702,

which supplies that testimony of qualified expert witnesses may be admitted if
"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue .... " The admissibility of expert
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testimony is discretionary with the trial court and a decision will not be disturbed on
appeal absent an abuse of discretion.

State v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241, 245 (2008);

State v. Wright, 147 Idaho 150, 155 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642,
64 7 (1998).

When determining whether the district court abused its discretion, this

Court considers:

(1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of

discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Wright, 147 Idaho at 155.
Where, as here, the defendant raised the issue in the district court, once the
defendant meets his initial burden of showing that error occurred, the State then has the
burden of demonstrating to the appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
did not contribute to the jury's verdict. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010).
Dr. Richard Ofshe has been a professor at the University of California, Berkeley,
for 43 years. (Tr., p.2935, Ls.2-5.) He has won the Pulitzer Prize. (Tr., p.2938, Ls.2-8.)
He has been a consultant for numerous police departments since 1979 and, for the past
20 years, his work has focused on police interrogation.

(Tr., p.2940, L.5 - p.2943,

L.21.) He has testified 333 times in 38 states, in federal, state, and military courts.
(Tr., p.2975, Ls.15-18.)
Dr. Ofshe explained that in modern interrogation techniques, the interrogator will
want to get the suspect's confidence level low because, "it's easier to get somebody to
shift if they believe that their situation is hopeless."

(Tr., p.2956, Ls.22-25.)

An

interrogator will want to appear absolutely confident in everything he says no matter
how personally unsure he may be about what he is saying. (Tr., p.2958, Ls.1-15.)
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The interrogator will then start to use "evidence ploys;" an evidence ploy, "is any
statement which, if it were true, would link the person to the crime." (Tr., p.2959, Ls.1520.) Evidence ploys can be either truthful or completely false. (Tr., p.2959, Ls.21-25.)
These evidence ploys can lower the confidence of a subject whether or not they have
actually committed the crime. (Tr., p.2961, Ls. 7-17.)
Interrogators then usually move on to a "motivational strategy."

(Tr., p.2963,

Ls.3-12.) "Low-end tactics are sort of the appeals to how you present yourself to the
world; how the world thinks about you, what people are going to think about it."
(Tr., p.2963, Ls.13-19.)

If that fails, "the interrogator is likely to move up the strain

scale," by suggesting that the prosecutor or judge is going to hate them, "so you don't
want to go into court with that story." (Tr., p.2964, Ls.7-17.) Beyond this point, there is
a line between what the courts have determined is acceptable; interrogators cannot use
physical coercion and are not supposed to promise leniency. (Tr., p.2965, L.3 - p.2966,
L.21.) However, Dr. Ofshe testified that interrogators have been trained to accomplish
the same thing as the promises of leniency by using a "scenario crime," a story
"introduced by the interrogator for the purpose of leading the suspect to believe that, if
you tell this story, you will get leniency." (Tr., p.2956, Ls.18-24.) Rather than simply
threatening the death penalty, the interrogator can suggest that, "it's inevitable you're
going to get the death penalty, but hasn't said it blatantly, has said it through
suggestion." (Tr., p.2968, Ls.17-24.) Dr. Ofshe testified that these techniques produce
false confessions because the person is made to feel completely hopeless, because,
"all that matters is, are you going to be able to save your life or be punished for
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something you didn't do with the ultimate punishment, or something along those lines."
(Tr., p.2969, Ls.1-9.)
Dr. Ofshe then testified to the types of false confessions; there are voluntary
false confessions, compliant false confessions, and persuaded false confessions.
(Tr.2973, p., Ls.17-25.)

In a voluntary false confession, a person confesses but not

because they are being interrogated; they could be unstable or want to protect someone
else.

(Tr., p.2973, Ls.17-23.)

In a compliant false confession, a person makes a

decision to confess to a crime they did not commit.

(Tr., p.2973, Ls.23-25.)

In

persuaded false confessions, a person can actually come to believe that they probably
committed a crime because they have absolutely no memory.

(Tr., p.2974, Ls.3-8.)

Most false confessions are compliance false confessions. (Tr., p.2976, Ls.5-17.)
The techniques described by Dr. Ofshe have become known as the Reid
method. (Tr., p.2979, Ls.6-12.) In regard to self defense claims,
What Reid teaches, or tries to teach anyway, is that after the interrogator
is able to get the person to give the false - the false self defense
confession, Reid then tells them, now what you should do is literally attack
that very confession that's the theme you gave them, because - and these
are my words - it doesn't fit the facts of the crime.
(Tr., p.2986, Ls.14-22.)
Dr. Ofshe testified that after the confession occurs, "the real work of the
interrogation begins." (Tr., p.2990, Ls.4-11.) At this point, the interrogator wants the
suspect to volunteer information about the crime that they have not been accidentally or
deliberately contaminated with. (Tr., p.2990, Ls.4-21.) Dr. Ofshe continued,
Typically, what happens in an unreliable confession is that the interrogator
asks about things that the suspect has not been contaminated with. The
suspect guesses. And those guesses are liable to be wrong, very likely to
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be wrong, unless they're simple things like, was the body face up or the
body face down?
(Tr., p.2994, Ls.4-10.) As explained below, Dr. Ofshe was not permitted to apply his
expertise to the facts of this case.

Mr. Meister's offer of proof as to what Dr. Ofshe

would testify to was supplied to the district court.

(R., pp.1515-1556.; Defendant's

Exhibit A. 2 )
Dr. Ofshe's report acknowledged that there was a dispute as to what techniques
were employed because Mr. Meister and the authorities had conflicting statements.
Dr. Ofshe identified four questions about Mr. Meister's interrogation: 1) did Westbrook
and Kastens threaten Meister with the death penalty through direct statements or
suggestion; 2) did Westbrook and Kastens either deliberately or unintentionally
contaminate Mr. Meister by feeding him information about the crime; 3) did Westbrook
supply Mr. Meister with a story about how he came to murder Ms. Hart that was
designed to influence Mr. Meister to believe he would receive leniency; and 4) did
Westbrook and Kastens lie to Mr. Meister about the evidence they possessed.
(Defendant's Exhibit A, p.4.) Dr. Ofshe concluded that, based on Mr. Meister's account
of the interrogation, Westbrook and/or Kastens did all of the above.

(Defendant's

Exhibit A, p.4.)
However, even based solely on Westbrook's account of the interrogation,
Dr. Ofshe recognized the interrogation tactics.

(Defendant's Exhibit A.)

Westbrook

emphasized to Mr. Meister what had happened in a "locally famous murder case,"
where Westbrook had not allowed the defendant to confess, and the defendant received

2

This Exhibit was submitted at the motion hearing held on November 22, 2010. Exhibit

A is the report Dr. Ofshe prepared for the instant case.
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the death penalty. (Defendant's Exhibit A, p.11.) 3 Westbrook told Mr. Meister that he
believed he was different. (Defendant's Exhibit A., p.12.) Westbrook then employed a
sympathetic scenario where he stated that he knew that Mr. Meister was taking the
blame alone and knew he would never have committed this crime if someone had not
put him up to it. (Defendant's Exhibit A, p.12.) Dr. Ofshe believed that Mr. Meister was
put in a situation where he believed he had two options - a death sentence if he did not
confess, or some other sentence if he did. (Defendant's Exhibit A, p.13.)
After analyzing Mr. Meister's confession, Dr. Ofshe concluded that the statement
"yields numerous examples of facts Meister volunteered about the crime that are
disproved or are not corroborated by the case facts." (Defendant's Exhibit A., p.16.)
These examples are:
1) Mr. Meister stated that while fleeing the trailer he removed corduroy pants and a
red flannel shirt and no such clothing was found, and the only eyewitness saw a
man in a yellow flannel shirt;
2) Mr. Meister stated that he was wearing a pair of his old shoes when those shoes
are a different size footprint than those left in the snow, and that the prints show
a full tread;
3) Mr. Meister stated that he saw a police cruiser turn into the road immediately
after the shooting, and hearing sirens when no officer was the at the scene at
that time;
4) Mr. Meister stated that he wrapped a scarf around his face, and the eyewitness
testified that the suspect's face was uncovered; and

3

Westbrook was referring to the Dale Shackelford case.
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5) Mr. Meister statement that he announced to his co-workers that he would kill
someone for $1,000 was not confirmed by his co-workers.
(Defendant's Exhibit A, p. 16-17.)
After the district court denied Mr. Meister's renewed motion to suppress, the
State filed a motion seeking to exclude the testimony of Dr. Ofshe altogether.
(R., p.1472.) Mr. Meister responded, asserting that Dr. Ofshe should be permitted to
testify as to his expertise in false confessions, with the only limitation being that
Dr. Ofshe could not testify as to his ultimate opinion that Mr. Meister's confession was
false. (R., p.1509.) Specifically, Mr. Meister asserted,
[i]t is without question Dr. Ofshe is a qualified expert in the field of false
confessions. He is not [sic] and will not testify that David Meister's [sic[
confessed falsely. He will testify [that] the circumstances surrounding
David's interrogation are such as to create an environment where false
confessions occur.
(R., p.1509.) The district court granted the State's motion in part, and denied it in part.
The district court held,
The Court had the opportunity to hear from Dr. Ofshe in a pretrial hearing.
Based upon the testimony provided during the pretrial hearing, it is clear
that Dr. Ofshe has specialized knowledge on the subject of false
confessions. Further, he can provide testimony on this subject that is
beyond the common sense, experience and education of the average
juror.
However, the State's argument that Dr. Ofshe should be prohibited from
testifying whether Meister confession was involuntary or coerced, or
whether the confession was true of false is well taken. This Court has
previously ruled on the issue of whether Meister voluntarily made the
confession and thus, this ruling stands. As to the issue of whether the
confession is true or false, this is a question which is appropriately left for
the jury to decide.
(R., pp.1589-90.)

Further, the court concluded, "[i]n summary, the State's motion in

limine to exclude the testimony of Dr. Richard Ofshe is granted in part, and denied in
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part.

Dr. Ofshe is prohibited from testifying regarding the voluntariness of Meister's

confession and whether the confession was true or false." (R., p.1592.)
Mr. Meister acknowledges that it is not entirely clear where the district court drew
the line with respect to Dr. Ofshe's ability to testify regarding the facts of Mr. Meister's
interrogation. However, the scope of the order became clear at trial. Midway through
Dr. Ofshe's trial testimony, Mr. Meister made an offer of proof with respect to the
testimony that the court had excluded. (Tr., p.3019, Ls.11-16.) Counsel for Mr. Meister
stated, "[a]nd what we did at the pretrial motion hearing was have Dr. Ofshe testify. He
covered the issues more exhaustively than he did today. And specifically, he talked
the application of
excluded by Your Honor's

to the

this case, something that's

ruling." (Tr., p.3019, Ls.17-22 (emphasis added).)

Neither the State nor the district court expressed any disagreement with counsel's
interpretation that Dr. Ofshe would not be permitted to apply his expertise to the facts of
this case.
Further, during the State's cross-examination of Dr. Ofshe, Mr. Meister again
sought permission to "question [Dr.] Ofshe about the application of the facts to this
case," because Mr. Meister believed that the State had opened the door. (Tr., p.3029,
Ls.3-8.) Again, Mr. Meister emphasized that he was not seeking to have Dr. Ofshe offer
his opinion that the confession was false; counsel stated, "And I don't [intend to offer]
his conclusion that Mr. Meister's confession is false. We've never asked that. It was
never our intention.

But simply allow Dr. Ofshe to testify how the facts of this case

specifically operate in the diagram that he explained yesterday." (Tr., p.3030, Ls.1-7.)
The court then denied Mr. Meister's request to question Dr. Ofshe regarding the
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application of his theory to the facts of this case.

(Tr., p.3032, Ls.5-10.) Thus, the

district court clearly denied Mr. Meister the ability to have his expert witness apply his
expertise to the facts of the case. The district court erred by doing so.
Under I.R.E. 702, an expert witness may provide an opinion "[i]f scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Once a trial court qualifies a witness as an
expert, it "must determine whether such expert opinion testimony will assist the trier of
fact in understanding the evidence." State v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241, 246 (2008).
Expert testimony that only vouches for the credibility of another witness "encroaches
upon the jury's vital and exclusive function to make credibility determinations, and
therefore does not 'assist the trier of fact' as required by Rule 702." State v. Almaraz,
154 Idaho 584, 599 (2013) (citing State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 525 (2003)).
However, expert opinion testimony that is admissible under I.R.E. 702 "is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact."
Id. at 599-600 (citing I.R.E. 704.)

"Indeed, we have routinely held that 'an expert's

opinion, in a proper case, is admissible up to the point where an expression of opinion
would require the expert to pass upon the credibility of witnesses or the weight of
disputed evidence. To venture beyond that point, however, is to usurp the jury's
function."' Id. at 600 (citing Perry, 139 Idaho at 525).

The district court abused its

discretion in denying Mr. Meister the opportunity to challenge the voluntariness of his
confession, and to have Dr. Ofshe apply his expertise to the facts of this case.
First, the district court held that, because it had determined that the confession
was voluntary, Dr. Ofshe would not be permitted to testify regarding the voluntariness of
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the confession.

(R., pp.1589-92.) However, despite the fact that the court ruled the

confession admissible, Mr. Meister was still entitled to challenge its weight and
credibility. A case involving Dr. Ofshe's expertise is directly on point. The Supreme
Court of Indiana has observed, "a trial court's determination that a defendant's
statement was voluntary and admissible does not preclude the defense from
challenging its weight and credibility." Miller v. State, 770 N.E.2d 763, 772 (Ind. 2002).
Quoting a decision from that state's Court of Appeals, the court stated the proper
standard:
[T]he trial court must make a preliminary factual determination of
voluntariness when assessing the statement's admissibility. The jury,
however, remains the final arbiter of all factual issues under Article 1,
Section 19 of the Indiana Constitution. Even if the court preliminarily
determines that the statement is voluntary and admits it for the jury's
consideration, then the defendant is still entitled to dispute the
voluntariness of the statement once it is presented to the jury. Although
the court has previously determined voluntariness in connection with the
statement's admissibility, the jury may find that the statement was
involuntarily given. If the jury makes such a determination, then it should
give the statement no weight in deciding the defendant's guilt or
innocence.

Id. 772-73 (quoting Morgan v. State, 648 N.E.2d 1164, 1170 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)).
Thus, Mr. Meister was entitled to challenge the weight, credibility, and voluntariness of
the statement.
Second, the district court erred by precluding Dr. Ofshe from testifying
specifically to the procedures used in Mr. Meister's confession. Mr. Meister submits that
the Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion State v. Almaraz is controlling regarding this
issue. In Almaraz, the defendant sought to permit its eyewitness identification expert to
testify regarding the specific procedures used in a witness's interview. Almaraz, 154
Idaho at 600. The district court ruled that expert testimony as to the accuracy of the
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witness's identification would have invaded the province of the jury, but the Idaho
Supreme Court noted that the expert's opinion did not go to the accuracy of the
identification, but that the expert would have, "testified about the specific instances of
police suggestiveness, which would have been helpful to the average juror's
understanding of whether the interview was conducted in an overly suggestive way.
Courts should not overly restrict expert testimony that assists the jury." Id. The Court
further explained,
Testimony relating to the proper guidelines for conducting an accurate
interview or lineup, whether or not those procedures were followed in
the case
hand, and the consequences of non-compliance with those
procedures does not invade the province of the jury.
disallowed
offered by
Reisberg was aimed at specific ..,.,.r,,,.,.,."'
by Officer
and how empirical research
shown
those procedures to be suggestive. Dr. Reisberg was not offering an
opinion on the credibility or accuracy of the eyewitness testimony
itself. Credibility is an issue for the jury, as the jury is the lie detector in
the courtroom. See Perry, 139 Idaho at 525. The district court erred by
excluding Dr. Reisberg's testimony on the ground that it would invade the
province of the jury, when the testimony was not an opinion on Hust's
credibility.
Id. (emphasis added). Mr. Meister submits that the only distinction between this case

and Almaraz is that Almaraz concerned an eyewitness identification expert and this
case concerns a false confession expert, a distinction with no legal difference; expert
witness testimony on false confessions also assists the jury. The district court correctly
ruled so in this case.

(R., p.1589.) Further, caselaw from other jurisdictions clearly

holds that expert testimony on false confessions assists the jury. See, e.g., Miller, 770
N.E.2d at 774. Boyer v. State, 825 So. 2d 418, 419-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). The
Miller court concluded,

Dr. Ofshe's testimony would have assisted the jury regarding the
psychology of relevant aspects of police interrogation and the interrogation
of mentally retarded persons, topics outside common knowledge and
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experience. In the event that some of Dr. Ofshe's testimony to the jury
would have invaded Rule 704(b )'s prohibition of opinion testimony as to
the truth or falsity of the defendant's statements, the trial court could have
sustained individualized objections at trial.
Miller, 770 N.E.2d at 774.

Mr. Meister was very clear that he was not seeking to have Dr. Ofshe opine that
Mr. Meister's confession was false as that would have invaded the province of the jury.
Mr. Meister was simply seeking to have Dr. Ofshe apply his expertise to the facts of this
case, just as the defendant sought to do in Almaraz.

Dr. Ofshe should have been

permitted to discuss the specific questions and procedures employed by Detective
Westbrook without commenting on whether he believed Mr. Meister or Detective
Westbrook to be credible.
The heart of Mr. Meister's defense was that his confession was false and that
Lane Thomas was likely the perpetrator.

"Because in this case [ ... ] Dr. Ofshe's

testimony 'went to the heart' of Appellant's defense, its exclusion cannot be considered
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."

Boyer, 825 So. 2d at 420. Just as in Almaraz,

the district court erred by limiting Dr. Ofshe's testimony. And for the reasons set forth in
Section l(B), infra, this error is not harmless.

Because Dr. Ofshe should have been

permitted to apply his expertise to the facts of Mr. Meister's case, his conviction must be
vacated.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Meister requests that this Court grant his Petition for Review,
convictions, and remand his case for further proceedings.
DATED this 5th day of May, 2014.
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